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Abstract  
 
This  paper  analyses  the  evolution  of  Corporate  Governance  (CG) 
mechanisms  and  organizational  changes  of  the  Hellenic 
T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n  O r g a n i z a t i o n  ( H T O )  a n d  h a s  t w o  o b j e c t i v e s :  t o  
enrich the debate and to contribute to the increasing body of literature 
by examining and analyzing the organizational and institutional changes 
taken  place  in  the  HTO;  and  to  place  the  HTO’s  case  within  the 
international  debate  regarding  the  privatization  of  state-owned 
companies  and  the  importance  of  CG  mechanisms  as  instruments  of 
change. It is argued that the privatization of state-owned companies, 
when is accompanied with appropriate reform measures, can produce 
multiple positive effects. CG reforms were the main instruments that 
used in order to prepare the telecommunications incumbent to face the 
open and competitive markets.  
 
Keywords:  Corporate  Governance   Hellenic  Telecommunications 
Organization (HTO), state-owned companies, privatization, change 
,
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1.  Introduction 
 
Liberalization  of  the  markets  and  large-scale  privatization 
programs are the main policies implemented worldwide over the last 
twenty years (Kole and Lehn, 1997). Great challenges emerged then for 
state-owned  companies  that  face  the  competitive  markets:  how  to 
adopt  contemporary  structures  and  practices  in  order  to  compete 
effectively  in  the  open-markets  regime?  State-owned  companies 
c o n s t i t u t e  a  d i v e r s e  t y p e  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a n d  e c o n o m i c  f o r m ,  a n d 
constitute  a  considerable  player  in  the  economic  scene  worldwide. 
Indeed, according to the OECD (2004a), they represent up to 20% of 
GDP, approximately 10% of the employment, and around 40% of market 
capitalization  in  OECD  countries.  At  the  same  time,  debates  on 
Corporate  Governance  (CG)  of  state-owned  companies  that  are 
partially  privatized  are  equally  as  important  as  those  of  private 
companies.  However,  the  governance  processes  and  management 
policies of state-owned companies have to take into account a number 
of political constraints. The intervention of government, through formal 
or  “behind  the  scenes”  processes,  to  impose  on  the  management 
political objectives has a significant impact on the way the state-owned 
companies organize their business. Politicians have always a motive to 
pursue  political  goals,  such  as  over-employment  in  state-owned 
c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  e v e n  i n  f u l l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  e n v i r o n m e n t s ,  c a u s i n g  
significant inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). It is worth noting 
t h a t  t h e  O E C D ,  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  i m p r o v i n g  t h e  g o v e r n a n c e  i s  a n  
important public policy objective, developed recently a set of voluntary 
guidelines on CG of state-owned companies (OECD, 2004a).    
 
  3The state plays a significant role in major Greek listed and non-
listed companies. The objective of this paper is twofold. First, to enrich 
the  debate  in  this  area  and  to  contribute  to  the  increasing  body  of 
literature  by  examining  and  analyzing  the  organizational  and 
institutional  changes  taken  place  in  the  HTO,  the  state-controlled 
dominant  telecommunication  organization  in  Greece,  which  now  is 
partially  privatized.  Second,  to  place  the  HTO’s  case  within  the 
international  debate  regarding  the  privatization  of  state-owned 
companies and the importance of CG mechanisms in place. It is claimed 
that CG reforms were the main instruments to gradually transform the 
company from a government-run monopoly to a competitive company 
pursuing shareholder value-oriented objectives. From 1996, the Greek 
state reduced its participation in HTO’s share capital and an effort to 
establish  an  entrepreneurial  and  “shareholding”  culture  at  the  HTO 
began.  At  the  same  time,  a  series  of  actions  for  opening 
telecommunications  market  to  competition  and  strengthening  capital 
market  initiated  by  the  Greek  government,  under  the  EU  pressure. 
G i v e n  t h e  s i z e  a n d  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ,  i t s  r e s t r u c t u ring 
was not an internal organizational issue only, but involved key outside 
a c t o r s ,  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  o f  w h i c h  w a s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  F r o m  a  
management-of-change point of view, the transformation process of a 
state-controlled organization, like the HTO, should be seen within its 
broader institutional context, focusing on a number of interdependences 
among the different stakeholders (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000; Tsoukas 
and  Papoulias,  2005).  The  transformation  process  of  the  company 
involved  a  high  degree  of  complexity,  difficulties  and  conflicts.  It  is 
claimed that at the early stages of the company’s change process the 
adopted  mechanisms  are  still  fragile  and  significant  backward  steps 
may be occurred.     
 
  4The paper is structured as follows. Part one is an introduction. 
Part two provides some background about the CG framework in Greece 
and  describes  the  evolution  of  CG  of  state-owned  companies.  The 
European experience of telecommunications’ privatization and reform is 
presented in part three. The HTO case is presented in part four, where 
the  evolution  of  CG  mechanisms  and  organizational  structures  are 
analyzed,  together  with  some  critical  points  related  to  HTO’s 
transformation process. Part five concludes by summarizing the main 
points  of  the  paper  and  discussing  interesting  issues  with  potential 
implications for the partially privatized state-controlled companies. 
 
 
2.  The evolution of CG of state-owned companies in Greece 
 
2.1       Recent developments 
Traditionally  Greek  companies  were,  and  most  of  them  still 
remain, family owned. However, the significant use of IPOs as means 
for  raising  capital  in  the  late  1990's  turned  these  companies  from 
private-family owned to public listed companies, offered the first sign 
that the long lastin g operatin g method s had to be reconsidered. The 
discussion  on  CG  in  Greece  is  focused  mainly  toward  protecting 
individual and minority shareholders' interests that are practically cut 
o f f  f r o m  t h e  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  f i r m  ( X a n t h a k i s  e t  al., 
2003;  Spanos  et  al.,  2004;  Tsipouri  and  Xanthakis,  2004;  Spanos, 
2005). The speculative events in the Greek capital market during 1999 
led the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) and the state to 
take an active role, introducing rules, regulations and codes of conduct.  
 
  5The  legislative  framework  of  the  Greek  capital  market  is  now 
f u l l y  h a r m o n i s e d  w i t h  t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  a n d  d i r e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  E U .  The 
disclosure framework is quite strong and in line with the EU trends. 
The ownership dispersion is considered as middle to low
1, consistent 
with  most  other  continental  European  countries
2.  A  first  major  step 
toward the formation of a comprehensive framework on CG has been 
the  publication  of  a  voluntary  code  of  conduct,  which  was  closely 
modelled according to OECD Principles on CG (OECD, 1999). In 2002 
the  government  amended  the  corporate  law  and  incorporated 
fundamental  CG  obligations.    Although  improvements  in  CG  have 
occurred  in  Greece,  they  are  mainly  confined  to  a  small  number  of 
l a r g e  l i s t e d  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  a r e  m o r e  i n  t u n e  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r n a t i onal 
corporate stage.  
 
2 2      CG of state-owned compan es  .   i
                                                
In Greece the state owns or controls companies of all sizes, in 
various  sectors,  like  banking,  telecommunications,  energy,  transport, 
tourism, defense, lottery and culture. The dominant role of the state in 
many companies is not a domestic phenomenon. The state usually plays 
an important role as the controlling shareholder in continental Europe. 
In the EU, the state remains the largest direct or indirect shareholder 
in  45  out  of  143  large  capitalization  privatised  companies  (OECD, 
2004c). Given the number and size of companies under state control 
 
1 According to the HCMC (2001), in 370 listed companies in Greece, average ownership dispersion 
was 47.22% when the major shareholder is defined as the shareholder owing at least 5%. In total, 
according to the study, the 370 listed companies were held by 974 major shareholders, while the major 
shareholders per listed company were around 3.  
2 A recent study by Faccio and Lang (2001), in a sample of 3,740 in five Western European countries 
(France, Spain, Italy, UK and Germany) documented a small degree of ownership dispersion.  
  6around  the  world,  an  important  issue  is  how  to  improve  CG,  and 




In Greece, the holdings of the state and the state-related entities 
are  substantial  and  may  allow  it  to  have  significant  influence  on 
decisions  submitted  to  vote  of  the  companies’  shareholders.  Before 
1996, the state, as the dominant shareholder, had the power to influent 
directly the budgetary and investment plans, the personnel recruitment 
and the appointment of the board (Rapanos, 2000). The intervention of 
government often imposed on companies’ executives (mainly political 
appointees)  political  objective  such  as  the  excess  creation  of  jobs
4, 
which created political benefits, but created economic inefficiencies
5. In 
particular,  in  1983  the  Socialistic  Government  passed  the  law  on 
“Socialization  of  State-run  Undertakings  and  Utilities”
6.  In  1996  the 
government passed a new legislation, enabling state-owned companies 
                                                 
3 A considerably body of literature has studied whether state ownership is value-destroying or is better 
than private ownership. Boardman and Vining (1989) documented evidence that, in both developed and 
developing countries, state-owned companies (or mixed state and privately-owned companies) were 
significantly less profitable that private-owned companies. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) empirically 
document that private-sector companies have significantly (and consistently) out-performed state-
owned companies for the past 25 years.  
4 Up to the early 1990’s state-owned companies were expanded to create employment around election 
time.  
5 The literature has emphasized inefficiencies associated to state governance via intervention on state-
owned companies (e.g., Kornai, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). 
6 The main feature of the law was the employees’ participation in the management and monitoring of 
state-owned companies, with the objective “to serve the national interest and society”. 
  7to operate like private companies. The new law
7 specified the duties 
and the responsibilities of the companies’ administrative organs and the 
main focus was on improving management.  
 
The  state-owned  companies  are  also  required  to  draw  up  and 
submit to the relevant ministers a strategic plan and a three- to five-
y e a r  b u s i n e s s  p l a n .  T h e y  a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  m o n i t o r  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a tion 
process,  while  external  auditors  are  hired  to  ensure  financial 
transparency. Although the above changes were useful, there was still 
much inefficiency. For example, in the newly deregulated sectors, like 
telecommunications, the state often plays a dual role of regulator and 
owner  vis-à-vis  state-owned  companies,  which  often  creates 
distortion  of  competition
8.  In  addition,  state  participation  in  state-
owned  companies’  boards  is  still  excessive  and  lacks  appropriate 
competence levels
9.   
 
It is worth mentioning, however, that the new law was only an 
element of a reform-agenda to change the broader institutional-cultural 
environment. In particular, the law was a part of a broader domestic 
agenda  on  “modernization”  proclaimed  by  the  government  of  Costas 
Simitis after 1996. The Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria for joining the 
European Monetary Union and the eurozone put strong pressure on the 
government  to  achieve  macroeconomic  stability  and  nominal 
                                                 
7 Law on “Modernization of State-run Undertakings and Organizations and other provisions”.  
8 The OECD (2004a) guidelines on CG of state-owned enterprises state that the clear separation of 
regulation and ownership is regarded as good practice.  
9 As the OECD (2004a) guidelines mention, the state representatives might be viewed as directors who 
represent the Minister’s point of view and this could be disruptive to the rest of the board. The board 
might consider that the state monitors directly the company. 
  8convergence. Furthermore, a structural reform programme included the 
privatization  of  state-owned  companies,  opening  markets  to 
competition, improving capital market transparency, and restructuring 
and  simplifying  administrative  procedures.  Privatizations  were  mainly 
driven  by  the  need  of  the  Greek  government  to  attract  investment 
capital,  improve  corporate  efficiency,  establish  an  entrepreneurial 
culture  in  state-owned  companies, p r o m o t e  a  “ s h a r e h o l d i n g ”  c u l t ure 
among  citizens,  reduce  public  deficits  and  liberalize  monopolistic 
markets,  such  as  banking,  telecommunications  and  energy
10.  The 
method of privatization used by the government was the public offering 
of shares in the stock exchange, adopting a gradualist strategy.  
 
 
3.  Privatization and reform in European telecoms 
 
Telecommunications  services  in  European  countries  have  been 
provided  by  large  state-owned  monopolies,  within  the  Ministry  of 
Telecommunications  or  other  government-related  agency.  The 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector in EU countries started 
in 1987
11 and the telecommunications markets opened to competition 
following the EU requirements. However, the processes of privatization 
and  liberalization  evolved  at  different  speeds  among  EU  countries 
(Goldstein,  2000).  Nestor  (2005)  concludes  that  CG  regime  is  an 
                                                 
10 Tsoukas and Papoulias (2005), refer to the third-order change as a process that typically involves a 
broader political project to modernize a country’s institutions. The main challenge in a third-order 
change process is to turn the state-political firm into a conventional firm that learns to compete in the 
marketplace.  
11 In 1987 the European Commission published the Green Paper on the Development of the Common 
Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment (European Commission, 1987). 
  9important instrument to facilitate the transition of the partly or wholly 
privatized  European  telecoms.  The  literature  shows  that  telecom 
privatization  is  associated  with  significant  operating  and  financial 
improvements  (e.g.,  Galal  et  al.,  1992;  Parker,  1994;  Megginson a n d  
Netter, 2001; Bortolotti et al., 2001).  
 
In Germany, the first important step in regulatory reform in the 
telecommunications  sector  was  taken  in  1989,  quite  earlier  than i n  
other  continental-European  countries.  The  state-owned  telephone 
company  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  (DT)  has  been  partially  privatized
12 
and the government owns around 42.3% today. The government is still 
the  dominant  shareholder  and  has  the  power  to  elect  all  the 
shareholders representatives of the supervisory board and controls the 
disposition  of  all  other  routine  matters  that  come  before  the 
shareholders meeting (Gordon, 1998; 2003). The government however 
has  expressed  its  long-term  inten t i o n  t o  f u l l y  p r i v a t i z e  t h e  c ompany 
(OECD, 2004b). France opened up its telecommunications market to full 
competition  in  1998  following  the  EU  requirements.  The  process  of 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector was met by strong labor 
union opposition
13, and the first attempt for partial privatization of the 
France Telecom (FT) in 1995 failed due to strong resistance by  the 
trade unions (Goldstein, 2000).  In 1997, the company issued shares on 
t h e  P a r i s  a n d  N e w  Y o r k  s t o c k  e x c h a n g e .  T h e  s t a t e  i s  t h e  d o m i n a n t 
                                                 
12 The DT’s IPO was the first time a German company made an IPO. 
13 This is also linked with the lack of strong political support for the creation of a competitive 
telecommunication market. In general, French governments in the early 1990’s were not strong 
supporters of the process of liberalization of the telecommunication market and tended to be followers 
in implementing EU-driven regulatory reforms (OECD, 2003).   
  10shareholder and now holds 54.5% of the company
14. According to the 
OECD (2003), the insufficient separation between the government as 
the core shareholder of FT and its role as regulator remains probably 
the  main  weakness  of  the  French  telecommunications  sector.  The 
Spanish  telecommunications  market  is  another  example  where 
regulatory reform was driven in order to meet the EU requirements. 
The privatization of Telefonica was completed in 1997 when the 21% 
stake of the state was sold. However, political mechanisms of control, 
in particular the golden share, were still in place after privatization. In 
addition, it is argued that the government created an agency problem 
inside the firm
15 (Jones et al., 1999; Bel and Trillas, 2005). 
 
 
4.  The transformation agenda at the HTO: Privatization, CG reforms 
and the role of the state 
 
4 1      Background  .  
                                                
The HTO was established in 1949 after a merger between the 
Greek Telephone Company S.A. (GTC
16) and Cable & Wireless and had 
exclusive rights over the operation of telecommunications services in 
Greece.  The  purpose  of  the  company  was  the  establishment, 
development,  operation  and  provision  of  telecommunications 
 
14 A new law has been adopted by the French parliament, which allows government’s shareholding to 
fall below 50%. However, it also allows employees of FT who are civil servants to retain statutory 
guarantees if FT loses its public service mission (OECD, 2003).   
15 Since the government kept the golden share, takeover threats were impossible. In addition, there 
were no strong shareholders to constraint the managers (Bel and Trillas, 2005).  
16 GTC was founded in 1930 by Siemens-Halske as its main shareholder. In 1946, as a compensation 
for war reparations, a percentage of 75% of GTC’s foreign shares were handed over to the Greek State.  
  11infrastructure  and  services.  It  had  also  the  obligation  to  secure 
confidentiality of telecommunications for all customers, including public 
services and armed forces. Effective as of January 1, 2001, the period 
of exclusivity in th e provisio n of fixed line voice telephony services 
expired  and  the  market  was  open  to  competition.  According  to  the 
legislation,  the  HTO’s  investment  programs  should  conform  to  the 
annual and five-year government investment programs; the Ministry of 
National Economy and the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
are  responsible  to  approve  or  to  reject  any  international  agreement, 
contact and tariff; the state should not interfere in HTO’s management.  
 
In 1980’s, under the new government of the Socialistic Party
17 
(PASOK), HTO and its subsidiaries became part of the public sector
18. 
HTO was considered as a “socialized” public utility enterprise, allowing 
employee representatives to participate in HTO’s board of directors
19. 
In 1990 the role of the state was strengthened, by increasing from six 
t o  e i g h t  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o n  t h e  b o a r d  of 
HTO  and  a  series  of  public  corporations.  An  attempt  of  the 
Conservative  Party  (New  Democracy
20),  to  privatize  it  in  1992  was 
                                                 
17 In office since 1981.  
18 It is worth noting that the first action in favour of state interventionism was taken during the 1974-
1981 period by the Conservative Government (New Democracy), which nationalized major companies, 
like Olympic Airways and the Commercial Bank of Greece.   
19 The “Socialization Act” , which introduced by the Socialistic Government of Andreas Papandreou in 
the early 1980’s, changed the governance of state-owned companies, by establishing the so-called goal 
of serving “the national interest and the social whole”. Representatives of the government, employees 
and several social groups were entitled to participate in the management of state-owned companies in 
order to serve the goals of the “socialized” public utilities enterprises (Papoulias and Lioukas, 1995).    
20 New Democracy succeeded the Socialistic Party in government in the early 1990’s. 
  12failed due to political disagreements and the strong opposition of HTO 
trade unions
21. It is pointed that after 1992 employees’ representatives 
used  elected  positions  in  administrative  organs  of  HTO  to  satisfy 
p e r s o n a l  a m b i t i o n s ,  w h i l e  t h e  s t a t e  p o w e r  u s e d  t o  s e r v e  p o l i t i c al 
interests (Tsiara, 1998). The new government of the Socialistic Party 
in  1993
22  followed  a  gradualist  approach  of  privatization.  The  first 
attempt  of  partial  privatization  in  1994  was,  however,  unsuccessful. 
HTO’s  initial  public  offering  (IPO)  took  place  in  1996  in  the  Athens 
Stock Exchange and the state’s share ownership was reduced to 92%
23. 
Presently, the state holds 33.7% of the HTO
24. However, the state still 
c o n t r o l s  t h e  c o m p a n y  t h r o u g h  o t h e r  s t a t e - r e l a t e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s
25. 
According to the law, under no circumstances may the state hold less 
than 33.3% of the company’s shares. The company ranks among the 
largest  telecommunication  organizations  in  Europe  and  is  the  leading 
telecommunications  operator  in  the  South-eastern  European  region. 
The  company’s  results  were  increased  sharply  during  the  first  two 
years after its IPO. Turnover and pre-tax profits increased by 51.4% 
and  15.0%  respectively  in  2000  compared  with  1997  (table  1). 
                                                 
21 HTO trade union (OME-OTE) is strong and influential within HTO and has consistently opposed the 
Greek State reducing its shareholding in HTO. 
22 The Conservative Government lost its marginal majority of one vote when an MP decided to 
withdraw his support. The affiliated press related the event with an earlier Government decision to halt 
procurement negotiations with local suppliers so that the strategic investor could take the decision. The 
country was led to premature elections and the Socialists returned to power.   
23 In 1996 Costas Simitis, the leader of the reformist and European movement within PASOK, was 
appointed to succeed Prime Minster Andreas Papandreou, who resigned due to ill health.  
24 As of December 31, 2003.  
25 The state-related Hellenic Exchangeable Finance holds 10.6%, while Hellenic Finance and DEKA 
SA (the privatization company of the Greek State) hold 2.8% and 0.017% respectively.  
  13However, pre-tax profits have been on a steadily deteriorating trend 
for  the  past  three  years,  reflecting  the  drop  in  Greek  fixed-line 
revenues,  due  in  part  to  the  regulator-imposed  cuts  in  leased-line 
tariffs,  as  well  as  to  lower  pricing.  The  shares  are  also  listed  for 
t r a d i n g  o n  t h e  F r a n k f u r t  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  a n d  t h e  B e r l i n  S t o c k  
Exchange. American Depository Shares (ADS’s) are listed on the NYSE 
and are also admitted to the official list of the London Stock Exchange 
and quoted on SEAQ International and on the Munich Stock Exchange. 
H T O  i s  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  i n  v a r i o u s  i n d e x e s  s u c h  a s  F T S E / A S E - 2 0  a n d  
FTSE Eurotop-300.   
 
--take in table 1-- 
4 2      Regulation and policy   .  
The  telecommunications  industry  in  Greece  is  dominated  by 
HTO. Until the late 1980’s the telecommunications sector, like in more 
European countries, has been a monopoly. The HTO had the exclusive 
rights  to  operate  the  telecommunication  services  in  the  country. 
Between April 1996 and June 2002, six sales of the HTO stock were 
conducted,  reducing  state’s  stake  to  33.7%.  The  Greek 
telecommunications  market  was  fully  liberalized  and  HTO’s  explicit 
right  for  the  provision  of  voice  telephony  was  removed.  Starting  in 
1990 the EU issue a series of Directives, which lead to the abolition of 
existing  monopolies,  and  permitted  the  competitive  provision  of  all 
telecommunications  services.  The  first  slow  step  toward  a  more 
liberalized  regime  began  in  1990  through  the  deregulation  of  value-
added services and mobile telephony services. The partial opening of 
the  telecommunications  market  was  enacted  in  1992  with  a  new 
legislation,  under  which  only  private  operators  could  provide  mobile 
telephony services, excluding HTO from the mobile telephone market. 
  14As a result, a duopoly regime was introduced by granting two licenses 
to  STET-Hellas  S.A.  (majority-owned  by  Telecom  Italia  Mobile)  and 
Vodafone-Panafon  S.A.  (majority-owned  by  Vodafone).  In  1994  the 
mobile telephony market was fully liberalized, allowing HTO to enter 
the  market  as  well.  In  1997,  HTO’s  right  to  develop  and  provide a  
mobile service was transferred to its subsidiary COSMOTE. 
 
A  number  of  laws  and  Ministerial  Decisions  supplemented  the 
regulatory framework, until the provision of voice telephony and the 
underlying public network infrastructure were fully deregulated, in line 
w i t h  t h e  E U .  I t  i s  w o r t h  n o t i n g  t h a t  G r e e c e  i n  g e n e r a l  l a g g e d  i n 
implementing the EU requirements and failed in taking decisions to help 
the process of liberalization. The Greek state applied for an extension 
of the official EU’s deadline  for full  liberalization in the provision of 
voice telephony and associated network infrastructure, reasoning that 
full digitalization and modernization of the public telephone network can 
only be achieved if HTO retains its exclusive rights in order to achieve 
sufficient  revenues  until  then.  However,  the  European  Commission 
rejected  most  of  the  reasoning  and  decided  to  provide  a  conditional 
extension to the Greek state until the end of 2000.  
 
In  2000,  in  the  light  of  full  liberalization  of  the 
telecommunications  market,  a  Telecommunications  Law  was  enacted. 
The main guidelines on the policy on telecommunications are drawn by 
the Minister of Transport and Communications. HTO is supervised by 
the National Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT), which 
is  an  independent  regulatory  authority,  enjoying  administrative a n d  
financial independence. As a listed company, HTO is also regulated by 
  15the principles of CG in the Greek legislation framework, as well as the 
US Stock Exchange Committee
26 (SEC).  
 
4.3       Path to privatization, organizational changes and CG reform   
                                                
CG  emerged  as  a  fundamental  instrument  to  the  process  of 
changing,  restructuring  and  rationalization  of  the  HTO.  The  CG 
mechanisms  that  companies  must  rely  on  are generally  distinguished 
into  two  types:  internal  mechanisms,  like  ownership  structure,  the 
board  of  directors,  and  the  management  structure,  and  external 
mechanisms,  like  market  competition,  the  legal  and  institutional 
framework and the supervision by the capital market. It is argued that 
both  internal  and  external  CG  mechanisms  are  necessary  to  be 
addressed  by  the  government,  in  order  to  make  state-owned 
companies  competitive.  After  1996,  HTO  undertook  a  strategy  of 
corporate  change  and  CG  restructuring  (internal  mechanisms),  while 
the  government  introduced  significant  institutional  and  regulatory 
changes (external mechanisms). The external CG mechanisms affected 
and determined to some extent the internal process of restructuring of 
HTO.  For  example,  investor  protection  reform  and  measures  to 
enhance  market’s  transparency  were  introduced  by  the  regulatory 
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  w h i l e  a  n e w  l a w  w a s  r e l e a s e d  r e q u i r i n g  f u n d a m e n t a l C G  
obligations.  Fundamental  institutional  policies  were  also  initiated  in 
o r d e r  t o  c r e a t e  m o r e  f l e x i b l e  a n d  t r a n s p a r e n t  p r o d u c t  a n d  l a b o u r 
markets, to lessen state intervention in the economy and to decrease 
public  sector’s  administrative  inefficiencies.    However,  changes  in 
corporate behaviour are usually complicated and involve conflicts with 
forces that have different views and interests.     
 
26 Since HTO’s shares trading on the NYSE from 1998.  
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HTO’s partial privatization was associated with changes in major 
internal  CG  mechanisms,  like  ownership  structure,  the  board  of 
directors  and  CEO/Chair  appointment.  In  1996  a  new  Chairman, 
Professor  Demetrios  Papoulias  with  a  strong  background  in 
restructuring state-owned companies (co-author of the present paper), 
was appointed and a new management team was created. So, the HTO’s 
reform agenda began. The new objectives were to design the partial 
privatization of HTO, to explore opportunities for expansion, to create 
a  “shareholding”  culture  within  the  company,  and  to  introduce 
contemporary  and  internationally  accepted  CG  and  management 
practices. An extensive promotional campaign made in 1996 in order to 
encourage purchase of HTO shares. The demand was very high and the 
IPO was oversubscribed. In 1998 the company successfully completed 
i t s  s e c o n d  p u b l i c  o f f e r i n g  a n d  s t a r t e d  t r a d i n g  o n  t h e  N Y S E .  T h e  
company  tried  to  attract  worldwide  institutional  funds  and  the 
international investor demand amounted to approximately 2.1 times the 
international  offer  size
27.  Gradually,  under-qualified  government-
appointed  directors  and  managers  were  replaced  by  qualified 
professionals
28.  An  Audit  Committee  (AC)  also  established  as  a 
s u p e r v i s o r y  a n d  c o n s u l t a t i v e  b o a r d - l e v e l  b o d y .  T h e  A C ,  w h i c h  a l so 
complies with NYSE rules, currently consists of three non-executive 
directors, of whom two are independent, and meets at least four times 
each year. In 2001, the reduction of government’s shareholding below 
                                                 
27 The total offering size was 50.4 million ordinary shares representing 10% of HTO’s outstanding 
share capital.  
28 In the literature, changes in the board of directors and the CEO of partial-privatized state-owned 
companies produce more effective monitoring and management (Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Boubakri et al., 2001).   
  1751%  was  accompanied  by  significant  CG  amendments  at  HTO.  In 
particular, all members of the board of directors (including the CEO and 
the  Chairman)  should  be  appointed  by  the  general  assembly,  not 
allowing  any  special  interest  group  (like  the  trade  unions  and  the 
Economic and Social Committee etc.) or shareholder (like the state) to 
nominate any director
29. The company offers, constantly the last years, 
incentives  for  early  retirement  in  order  to  reduce  its  workforce
30. 
Recent  discussions  between  the  management  and  the  trade  unions 
attempt to change the statues of the newly recruited employees, not 
allowing them to have civil servant status. 
 
In  addition,  in  order  to  prepare  for  full  competition,  HTO 
designed  a  regional  expansion  strategy  in  the  Southeastern  Europe. 
The  company  made  certain  investments  in  telephony  operators  in 
Serbia,  Armenia,  Romania,  Albania,  Bulgaria  and  the  Former 
Yugoslavian  Republic  of  Macedonia  (table  2).  However,  a  number  of 
Southeastern  companies  had  experienced  many  problems,  like  high 
inflation,  currency  fluctuations,  devaluations  of  the  local  currencies, 
and  armed  conflict  and  civil  strife.  All  these  conditions  affected 
adversely HTO’s international investments and businesses, resulting in 
a  decline  value.  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  company  has  now 
change  its  strategy  and  believes  that  direct  investments  in  other 
telecom operators are not necessary in order to support its regional 
expansion.     
 
                                                 
29 Practically, HTO was fully aligned to the Greek Companies Law and didn’t have anymore the 
obligation to follow the provisions of the 1996 law, exclusively designed for state-owned companies.     
30 The company’s number of employees has been gradually dropped for the past five years, at an 
average rate of 5.6% (HTO, Annual Report, 2003). 
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The  partial  privatization  of  HTO  was  among  the  largest  in  the 
Greek market accounting for a large share of the capitalization of the 
stock market. It is recognized that the significant growth and deepening 
of the Greek capital market have its roots, to some extent, in the large 
public  offerings  made  by  HTO.  In  addition,  HTO’s  IPO  and  public 
offering  involved  large  fraction  of  the  Greek  citizens  becoming 
shareholders for first time. In the IPO in 1996 a great number of Greek 
citizens  purchased  shares.  Promoting  shareholding  culture  among 
citizens was crucial, given the immaturity of the Greek capital market in 
1996.  The  government  had  also  immediate  budgetary  benefits  from 
HTO privatization (the total public revenues for the period 1996-2004 
were  estimated  by  HTO  at  €9.2  billion).  The  company’s  partial 
privatization program played a significant role in major reforms that the 
government  introduced  in  order  to  better  protect  shareholders.  The 
reform package was completed in response to a number of speculative 
events in the Greek capital market during 1999. Moreover, the financial 
educational impact of HTO’s public offerings for the domestic financial 
institutions,  which  served  as  underwriters,  was  very  important. T h e  
company’s  share  issue  privatization  program,  which  involved  the 
largest public offer ever made, was a unique opportunity for the Greek 
banking sector to test its capabilities, in order to face the intense IPOs 
and increases in share capital in 1998 and 1999.    
 
4 4      CG problems and conf icts of interest: an ongoing process  .   l  
Throughout  history,  HTO  has  been  a  large  organization,  with 
complex  structure,  opportunistic  behaviours,  special  interest  groups 
(inside  and  outside  the  company)  and  examples  of  favouritism  and 
  19politicized  decision-making  processes.  A  strong  and  influential  trade 
union consistently opposed the part-privatization of HTO. Given that a 
large-scale  transformation  program  affects  old-styled  and  rigid 
practices,  the  HTO’s  restructuring  process  involved  many  difficulties 
and  backward  steps.  Even  after  significant  CG  reforms  and 
organizational changes have been introduced, the company still faces 
major  challenges.  Indeed,  it  is  argued  that  the  company  has  not y e t  
developed  a  clear  culture,  due  to  regular  and  often  unreasonable 
organizational  changes.  More  importantly,  the  high  frequency  rate  of 
changes  is  related  with  conflicts  of  interest  among  politicians,  the 
management and other interested parties.         
 
The  regular  dismissals  of  HTO’s  chief  directors  and  senior 
managers were evaluated negatively by the market, as an indication for 
state intervention and mismanagement. It is worth noting that during 
the  period  1996-2004  the  company’s  CEO  and/or  Chairman  were 
replaced  almost  every  two  years.  Every  new  CEO  and  management 
t e a m  w a s  c o m i n g  w i t h  a  m a n d a t e  t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  a n d  r e o r g a n i z e  t h e 
company. It’s characteristic that the new head of the HTO
31 states that 
the  regular  CEO  changes  “has  created  entirely  justifiable  scepticism 
and, to some extent, the reception of every new management by the 
personnel is inevitably opportunistic” (HTO, Annual Report, 2003, pp. 
6-7). He  also criticized the previous management structure as being 
extremely complex. Under its new leadership, the company reduced the 
number  of  directors  from  15  to  11  and  abolished  the  Executive 
Committe e on CG. It is, however, extremely difficult for a large and 
complex  organization,  like  HTO,  to  effectively  acquire  patterns o f  
                                                 
31 In March 2004 the Conservative Party won the national election and three months later a new board 
was elected by the general assembly. 
  20management, thinking and acting that are subject to regular change. It 
i s  w o r t h  m e n t i o n i n g  t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a r  d i s m i s s a l s  o f  H T O ’ s  C E O  a n d 
Chairman were usually interpreted by the affiliated press as evidence 
for  crisis  in  the  company  management  and  complicated  conflicts  of 
interest among politicians, suppliers and the management.  
 
  Although  the  company  has  introduced  significant  CG  reforms, 
there is still room for improvement. Indeed, the company complies with 
what the legislation requires and doesn’t move further on a voluntary 
basis.  For  example,  the  company  has  established  an  AC,  but  other 
board-level committees (e.g., remuneration, nomination and CG/ethics 
committee) have not yet been established. The company doesn’t also 
disclose CG guidelines relating to compensation, directors qualifications 
etc. From 2001 the board Chairman and the CEO are the same person 
i n  t h e  c o m p a n y .  I t  i s  w e l l  k n o w n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  b o d y  o f 
literature  that  proposes  the  separation  of  the  two  roles  in  order  to 
achieve  a  balance  of  power.  The  OECD  (2004a)  suggests  that  such 
separation is a fundamental step in establishing strong boards in state-
owned companies. Finally, board size in HTO seems to be quite large, 
while international experience indicates that smaller boards allow for 
better  monitoring  of  management  and  less  political  interference
32. 
Newly  implemented  CG  mechanisms,  however,  require  a  significant 
amount  of  time  to  reach  their  potential  effectiveness.  In  the  early 
stages, these mechanisms are still fragile and we often observe cases 
where management bypass them.  
     
 
                                                 
32 The OECD (2004a) CG guidelines for state-owned companies recommend that board should be 
limited in size in order to encourage responsibility and function effectively.   
  215.  Summary and conclusions  
This  paper  examines  the  evolution  of  CG  and  organizational 
changes of a large state-owned company (HTO), which now is partially 
privatized,  with  a  significant  role  in  the  Greek  economy.  The 
significance  of  our  analysis  for  policy  makers  is  obvious:  The 
privatization  of  the  HTO,  through  the  stock  exchange,  was  the  first 
large-scale privatization made by the government and used as a model 
for other state-owned companies. It is argued that the privatization of 
large state-owned companies, when is accompanied with appropriate 
reform measures inside and outside the company, can produce multiple 
positive effects. HTO transformation process had a great impact inside 
and outside the company. Internally, new management structures were 
introduced  and  the  company  became  attractive  internationally.  In 
addition, the workforce acquired a culture of “belonging” in a company 
where  shareholders’  maximization  value  was  the  main  objective. 
Externally, HTO public offerings established a “shareholding culture” 
among  citizens,  affected  considerably  the  fiscal  position  of  the 
government by increasing the public revenues, and contributed to the 
deepening  of  the  Greek  capital  market  and  the  enhancement  of  the 
domestic banks, which used as underwriters.  
  
It is concluded that CG reforms were the main instruments that 
the  government  used  in  order  to  prepare  the  telecommunications 
incumbent to face the open and competitive markets. This process was 
combined  with  significant  regulatory  changes  and  the  creation  of  a 
strong institutional framework. HTO has been moved gradually from a 
state-owned  monopoly  managed  by  political  appointees,  to  a  newly 
partially privatized company with significant CG mechanisms in place. 
This process involved, however, many backward steps, as a result of a 
complex  nexus  of  conflicting  relationships  between  the  management, 
  22politicians and other parties (like the trade unions and the suppliers). 
Frequent CEO/Chairman changes, unreasonable organizational changes 
and  the  lack  of  continuity  affected  negatively  the  operation  of t h e  
c o m p a n y .  D i s c u s s i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  o f  c h a n g e  a t  H T O  w e  d r a w  o u r  
attention to the fragility of the mechanisms in place. Hence, significant 
implications  emerge  both  for  policy  makers  and  the  leaders  of  the 
partially privatized state-owned companies. The former, should seek to 
a p p o i n t  p r o f e s s i o n a l  m a n a g e r s  t o  r u n  t h e  c o m p a n i e s  a n d  e l i m i n a t e 
political-motivated  interventions  in  the  company’s  management.  The 
l a t t e r ,  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a  c l e a r  v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  c o m p a n y  a n d  a d o p t  
contemporary CG mechanisms in line with the international standards. 
I n  t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  c o m p a n y ’ s  l e a d e r  s h o u l d  i n v o l v e  t h e  b o a r d  
(including  minority  shareholders’  representatives)  and  other 
stakeholders. The new CG and organizational mechanisms need time in 
order  to  be  functional  and  well-established.  The  challenge  for  the 
company’s  leader  is  to  be  committed  to  effectively  manage  conflicts 
inside the company. The latter always increase the fragility of the new 
mechanisms. The lessons from the HTO case are very useful for many 
state-controlled companies that are partially privatized, or will be in 
the near future, through public offerings in Greece and in the new EU 
member-states,  where  transformation  and  privatization  are  great 
challenges.       
 
 









Highlights of Financial Results* (in € millions), 1997-2004 
  Turnover  Pre-tax profits  EBITDA 
1997  2,379.5 883.4 - 
1998  2,757.2 837.1 - 
1999  3,237.3 840.6 1,514.3 
2000  3,602.2 1,016.0 1,600.6 
2001  4,127.7 800.8 1,922.3 
2002  4,326.9 742.1 1,890.4 
2003  4,941.7 612.5 1,993.5 
2004  5,206.7 183.7 1,914.1 
 Source: HTO, Annual Reports and Press Releases        
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Table 2 
HTO’s Investments in Southeastern Europe  





Type of business 





Armenia  142.5 90.0%
Public telephony 
operator 





Albania  85.6 48.6%* Mobile operator 
CosmoBulgaria Mobile  Bulgaria  135.0 100.0% Mobile operator 
Cosmofon Mobile 
Telecommunications 
Services AD Skopje  
FYROM  25.0 100.0% Mobile operator 
Source: HTO, SEC FORM 20-F  2004  ,












  25 
 
Table 3 
Milestones in HTO’s Privatization Process  
 
              * The privatization company of the Greek state  
Date  Event 
Nov ‘92 
First  privatization  attempt  by  the  Conservative 
Government (“strategic investor initiative”) 
Sept ‘93 
The  privatization’s  negotiations  stopped.  The 
Socialists returned to the government 
Nov ‘94 
T h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  N a t i o n a l  E c o n o m y  f a i l e d  t o  f i n d  
interest  from  international  investors  for  partial 
privatization 
Apr ‘96 




nd PO and trading on the LSE. State’s shareholding: 
81.3% 
Jan ‘98 








th P O  i n  t h e  A S E  &  N Y S E .  S t a t e ’ s  s h a r e h o l d i n g :  
51.1%   
Apr ‘00  State’s shares increased to 52.4% 
Jul ‘00 
DEKA S.A. issued a convertible bond raising funds 
of 14.97 million shares 
Aug ‘01 
The state transferred to DEKA S.A. 10.68%. State’s 
shareholding: 41.7% 
Jun ‘02 
Book-building placement of 8% by the state. State’s 
shareholding: 33.7% 
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